and the children can't add in their heads and couldn't give you a percentage if their life depended on it . . . and that's exactly how the shekel shieks planned it
These psycho fucks can't ever stop pushing for Nuclear FUCKING ARMAGEDDON! All these fucking off the rails dumb as fuck ZioNazis are so clueless they somehow believe that a nuclear winter is a good idea! The best outcome from all of this would be to have every fucking last ZioNazi in Washington and for just the right sized (and just 1) nuke to hit and blow these evil Zionist Nazi Mass Murdering Sociopaths to HELL AND BACK!
Those are some informative numbers to contemplate.
My Lehman Bros., and GM Smartnotes, and MetLife all shrunk by 100%.
But, my social security went up by a couple of percentage points.
I save a considerable amount on motor fuels, and auto insurance, by being unable to afford either.
Tuna and ribeyes are extremely reasonable, when I’m shopping out of range of the eye in the sky.
But, if my stove “shits out”, I can’t afford a new range.
My income taxes have remained low (no), just like my return on bank deposits, cause I refuse to participate.
Exactly like the fucking sheep/shit show they call votin’.
I was thoughtful and prudent, and got the best medical insurance that was offered, yet somehow I have thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars in medical bills, that I cannot, and will not ever pay.
They’re fucked!!!
I’ve got nothing left worth taking.
In-surance don’t pay for a RX my MD highly recommends, and I ain’t spendin’ 30% of my monthly income on the shit that’s supposed to help me shit, like I’m sposed, to.
But, Jew and flu jabs are always readily available.
Safe and effective???
I’m not so sure about that shit.
Call me skeptical and constipated.
How much to fill a magazine???
I’d like a dozen, please.
Nine for the fuckin’ foul, freaks in the Foto, and some spares for senate-whore Lindsey Graham, and creeps.
I’m to hard up to git my own shotgun.
I knew a kid (Johnny), who beat bullets with a hammer, and shot another kid that way!!!
Funny, how these fucking soulless fucks are pushing for financial planning for the K12 crowd. You know, how to balance that non-existent checkbook. How to get fucked by realtors, mortgage companies, inspectors, the lot of them. How to stay current on the 19 % APR. How to wiggle around the PayDay Loan.
How to file Chapter 11. How to go out and get four credit cards, you know, to get that fucking credit score aboe 675.
No classes in around stopping class politics, fighting against mass marketing, staying the effects of brainwashing. Nah.
Easy reading: NOVEMBER 12, 2013, "How Franklin D. Roosevelt Botched Social Security"
BY ALAN NASSER
The seeds of neoliberal economic policy were planted during the founding years of twentieth century liberalism. The Democrats’ current embrace of fiscal conservatism is claimed by contemporary self-proclaimed New Dealers to be a repudiation of the founding bequest, a capitulation to reactionary Republican dogma. Budget deficits, we are told, were legitimated by Franklin D. Roosevelt during the New Deal as a legacy to future Democratic regimes. The political obligation to enhance social welfare is supposed to have trumped the old-time Hooverian taboo against government expenditures beyond government receipts.
Objections to this policy are thought to have been refuted not merely by Keynesian economic theory but mainly by successful practice: once Roosevelt put into place large scale deficit-funded projects like the Works Progress Administration, the economy was launched into its steepest cyclical expansion to this day, from 1933 to 1937. Reagan’s tirades against budget deficits are said to be a throwback to pre-Rooseveltian times and outdated orthodoxy. Imagine the chagrin of “the Democratic wing of the Democratic Party” when Clinton and Obama betrayed the heritage of the New Deal by seconding the Republican commitment to fiscal orthodoxy. The rustling sound you are supposed to hear is FDR tossing in his grave.
This story is the most recent supplement to the myth of the Democratic Party as the “Party of the working man.” It fails to recognize that fiscal orthodoxy and the correlative tethering of social benefit to work and wage level was central to Franklin Roosevelt’s political values and bequeathed to postwar American liberalism a distinctly conservative, anti-social-democratic thrust.
Roosevelt’s 1935 State of the Union Address announced to the nation the introduction of two landmark programs, the Social Security Act and the “new and greatly enlarged plan” for “emergency public works,” the Works Progress Administration (WPA). In the same speech the president revealed his disdain for “relief,” social assistance available to all in need irrespective of their ability to work.
Roosevelt was driven to WPA by two forces, the social upheaval and labor actions of the preceding years culminating in the extraordinary strikes of 1934, and the counsel of his advisors, many of whom were far more radical than he in their understanding of the Depression. Influential underconsumptionists and secular stagnationists pushed for a permanent federal government commitment to providing public employment for workers whose benefits had run out, who were not covered or who could not find private employment. But Roosevelt’s stated purpose “to preserve the system of private enterprise for profit” (3) required that his programs be “not so large as to encourage the rejection of opportunities for private employment or the leaving of private employment to engage in Government work [and that they] compete as little as possible with private enterprises.” (1935 State of the Union Address)
The permanent implication of government in the labor market was in the president’s eyes incompatible with these purposes. Roosevelt would support no abiding government guarantee of employment. “Work should be planned with a view to tapering it off in proportion to the speed with which the emergency workers are offered positions with private employers.” (1935 Address) The president thus disabled WPA from directly addressing the deficiency of consumption demand, consisting largely in wage-driven buying power, that defined the Depression. WPA could have paid wages higher than for example what the steel companies were offering, thereby boosting wages in the private sector where most workers would find employment. But he kept the WPA wage so low as “to compete as little as possible with private enterprises.” In an unwitting tribute to inefficiency and waste, steel workers were put to work cutting grass. (4) Here we have a fine illustration of the way in which reform efforts confined by the parameters of the political economy of capitalism function to provide short-run palliatives even as they reproduce the roots of the problem they are intended to solve.
Aristocrats like Roosevelt disparaged relief as encouraging public expectations of government provision of social benefits, and as an alternative to workers’ dependence on the employer to make a living. Roosevelt displayed unabashedly the disdain for relief characteristic of his class. In the 1935 Address he declared that
“[D]ependence upon relief induces a spiritual disintegration fundamentally destructive of the national fiber. To dole out relief in this way is to administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit. It is inimical to the dictates of a sound policy. It is in violation of the traditions of America. Work must be found for able-bodied but destitute workers. The federal government must and shall quit this business of relief.”
CES’s staff were, like so many New Dealers, more radical than the president. They cleverly appealed to traditional American notions of individual independence to argue for a system of national health insurance, without which no citizen could be truly “self-sufficient.” The American Medical Association so heavily imposed upon the Committee that the idea was dropped.
CES’s proposal for Social Security was no less radical. In order to gain Roosevelt’s support for a proposal well to the Left of the president’s instincts and values, they reaffirmed his unyielding distinction between “social insurance” for the “deserving unemployed” and relief or public assistance for the remaining unemployed. But they insisted that in order for this distinction to mark a fair and genuine difference between these groups, the federal government would have to ensure that the opportunity to work was always available. This could be made possible only by permanently providing guarantees of public employment to workers who had exhausted unemployment benefits, or were not insured, or could not find private employment. (5)
WPA would have to be universalized as enduring policy. This was indistinguishable from Keynes’s position noted above. The provision of social welfare could be maximally just and respectful of a citizen’s right, affirmed by Roosevelt himself, to earn a living only if public policies were in place to ensure full employment. Universal coverage of the elderly, CES proposed, would be effected by pensions paid for at first by both workers’ own contributions and the general revenues of the Treasury. Gradually the Treasury’s contribution would grow to cover most or all pension payments.
Roosevelt was adamantly opposed. The “relief” bugaboo kicked in, and the president dismissed the proposal as “the same old dole under another name.” (6) Roosevelt wanted a plan with no traces of relief, no form of government contribution to Americans’ welfare unrelated to their own work contribution. This was to apply both to unemployment and to retirement. It was essential for the
Roosevelt’s conception of Social Security required, then, an economic counterpart to the private individual insurance premium. This was to be the payroll tax, a deduction from the wage. Roosevelt held to this conceit well before he was elected and he reiterated the same commitment years after the Social Security Act was passed. As early as 1930 he declared that any benefits accorded to workers through legislation should “be a result of their own efforts and foresightedness” so that they would “be receiving not charity, but the natural profits (sic) of their years of labor and insurance.” In 1934 he instructed Congress that the program’s funds “should be raised by contribution rather than by general taxation.” In his first meeting with the drafters of the legislation he reiterated that old age insurance “must be self-supporting, without subsidies from general tax sources.” Shortly thereafter he told an assemblage of experts on social insurance programs that Social Security “must not be allowed to become a dole through the mingling of insurance and relief….[and] must be financed by contributions, not taxes.” In response to strong objections from Rexford Tugwell, one of his most articulate underconsumptionist advisors, the president emphasized that he was “inclined toward a wholly contributory scheme with the government not participating.” Two years after SSA was passed Roosevelt reiterated his basic conception of social insurance, and its grounds: “[A]s regards social insurance of all kinds, if I have anything to say about it, it will always be contributed, both on the part of the employer and the employee, on a sound actuarial basis. It means no money out of the Treasury.” (7)
Not only did the contributory scheme mean no money out of the Treasury, it could become a cash cow for Treasury. Roosevelt and his fiscally conservative Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau were in accord that the contributory system had the double economic advantage of linking social benefits to work and ameliorating some of government’s financial problems. Morgenthau anticipated that Social Security taxes could be lent to the Treasury to finance New Deal deficits (much as Lyndon Johnson in 1967 concealed deficits by creating the “unified budget,” counting Social Security surpluses as part of the government’s general operating budget), reducing government’s borrowing needs. Funding Social Security out of general revenues would not have permitted this gambit.
Commenting on the final legislation, historian William E. Leuchtenburg observes that “[T]he law was an astonishingly inept and conservative piece of legislation. In no other welfare system in the world did the state shirk all responsibility for old-age indigency and insist that funds be taken out of the current earnings of workers.” (8)
Radical New Dealers tended to frame the problem in class terms: the “channels of surplus investment,” the “idle’ and “sterile” savings of the rich were seen as the depleted resources of the working class. (9) The logical recourse was to tax the fallow funds of the rich and transfer that purchasing power to the working majority. It is no surprise that none of the popular financing alternatives for Social Security called for payroll tax contributions. A payroll tax was a wage tax, and who would support reducing wages in depression times? A progressive tax would do double duty: it would fund Social Security equitably while performing what so many of Roosevelt’s advisors took to be the cardinal task of the day, to redistribute income downwards.
The nation’s leading social-insurance authorities were among the redistributionists. Abraham Epstein repudiated Roosevelt’s plan as “a system of compulsory payments by the poor for the impoverished” that relieved “the well-to-do from their share of the social burden.” (10) The extent of genuinely Left sentiment pervading congressional debates was reflected in the fact that a social insurance bill extending unemployment benefits, with no financial burden on workers, to all those who had lost jobs for any reason made it through the House Labor Committee in 1935.
Roosevelt had frequently espoused the underconsumption analysis in his radio chats, but he refused to embrace its policy implications. As radical redistribution gained popularity, the administration became defensive, putting forward unconvincing arguments scoffed by conservatives and liberals alike. Roosevelt contended that the payroll tax would be “fair” to employees by virtue of the requirment that the employer too pay a tax into the same fund, demonstrating that the tax was not regressive.
Another of Roosevelt’s most common responses to critics of the wage tax was that it would accomplish two crucial objectives, to give workers a sense of personal and legal right to benefits since they had paid into the system out of their own pockets, and by the same token to ensure that “no damn politician” could ever attempt to take that right away. But if Roosevelt could claim in effect that the Treasury could not afford to pay Social Security benefits out of general revenues, why could not future politicians claim that government could not afford to pay the promised benefits without major “reforms” including extending the retirement age and reducing benefits?
Had Social Security been designed to be funded through “general taxation” it would have the fiscal status of the Pentagon budget. There is no special “fund” dedicated specifically to military aggression. Elites never claim that the Defense budget is running down, is unaffordable, is going broke or is draining resources from more pressing priorities. In an altogether different kind of society, a government guarantee of a lifelong decent standard of living would have just that kind of permanence.
SSA was not merely the nation’s grandest scheme to date to provide essential material security otherwise unavailable to Americans through the normal workings of the market. It was as importantly an exemplar of the profoundly conservative political-economic values and assumptions which would frame all subsequent political struggles around social policy and provision.
I have it for trillion$+++++++ expenditures for weapons of destruction (mass or otherwise), and ALL of the cocksuckers that play in that end of the pool.
Plenty of resources available for houseless junkies, drunkies, flunkys, kiddos, widows, and heroes.
There’s more of ‘em than’muricans real-eyes. ‘Parently, don’t give a fuk.
Back the Blue, and red and white(s), till it happens to ewe.
To protect the people the people should urgently shut to political whores of the climate sect!
I'M SICK OF IT!
These psycho fucks can't ever stop pushing for Nuclear FUCKING ARMAGEDDON! All these fucking off the rails dumb as fuck ZioNazis are so clueless they somehow believe that a nuclear winter is a good idea! The best outcome from all of this would be to have every fucking last ZioNazi in Washington and for just the right sized (and just 1) nuke to hit and blow these evil Zionist Nazi Mass Murdering Sociopaths to HELL AND BACK!
Those are some informative numbers to contemplate.
My Lehman Bros., and GM Smartnotes, and MetLife all shrunk by 100%.
But, my social security went up by a couple of percentage points.
I save a considerable amount on motor fuels, and auto insurance, by being unable to afford either.
Tuna and ribeyes are extremely reasonable, when I’m shopping out of range of the eye in the sky.
But, if my stove “shits out”, I can’t afford a new range.
My income taxes have remained low (no), just like my return on bank deposits, cause I refuse to participate.
Exactly like the fucking sheep/shit show they call votin’.
I was thoughtful and prudent, and got the best medical insurance that was offered, yet somehow I have thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars in medical bills, that I cannot, and will not ever pay.
They’re fucked!!!
I’ve got nothing left worth taking.
In-surance don’t pay for a RX my MD highly recommends, and I ain’t spendin’ 30% of my monthly income on the shit that’s supposed to help me shit, like I’m sposed, to.
But, Jew and flu jabs are always readily available.
Safe and effective???
I’m not so sure about that shit.
Call me skeptical and constipated.
How much to fill a magazine???
I’d like a dozen, please.
Nine for the fuckin’ foul, freaks in the Foto, and some spares for senate-whore Lindsey Graham, and creeps.
I’m to hard up to git my own shotgun.
I knew a kid (Johnny), who beat bullets with a hammer, and shot another kid that way!!!
Forget the bullets.
I’d rather try hammering instead.
Pelosi knows about that shit.
Funny, how these fucking soulless fucks are pushing for financial planning for the K12 crowd. You know, how to balance that non-existent checkbook. How to get fucked by realtors, mortgage companies, inspectors, the lot of them. How to stay current on the 19 % APR. How to wiggle around the PayDay Loan.
How to file Chapter 11. How to go out and get four credit cards, you know, to get that fucking credit score aboe 675.
No classes in around stopping class politics, fighting against mass marketing, staying the effects of brainwashing. Nah.
Easy reading: NOVEMBER 12, 2013, "How Franklin D. Roosevelt Botched Social Security"
BY ALAN NASSER
The seeds of neoliberal economic policy were planted during the founding years of twentieth century liberalism. The Democrats’ current embrace of fiscal conservatism is claimed by contemporary self-proclaimed New Dealers to be a repudiation of the founding bequest, a capitulation to reactionary Republican dogma. Budget deficits, we are told, were legitimated by Franklin D. Roosevelt during the New Deal as a legacy to future Democratic regimes. The political obligation to enhance social welfare is supposed to have trumped the old-time Hooverian taboo against government expenditures beyond government receipts.
Objections to this policy are thought to have been refuted not merely by Keynesian economic theory but mainly by successful practice: once Roosevelt put into place large scale deficit-funded projects like the Works Progress Administration, the economy was launched into its steepest cyclical expansion to this day, from 1933 to 1937. Reagan’s tirades against budget deficits are said to be a throwback to pre-Rooseveltian times and outdated orthodoxy. Imagine the chagrin of “the Democratic wing of the Democratic Party” when Clinton and Obama betrayed the heritage of the New Deal by seconding the Republican commitment to fiscal orthodoxy. The rustling sound you are supposed to hear is FDR tossing in his grave.
This story is the most recent supplement to the myth of the Democratic Party as the “Party of the working man.” It fails to recognize that fiscal orthodoxy and the correlative tethering of social benefit to work and wage level was central to Franklin Roosevelt’s political values and bequeathed to postwar American liberalism a distinctly conservative, anti-social-democratic thrust.
Roosevelt’s 1935 State of the Union Address announced to the nation the introduction of two landmark programs, the Social Security Act and the “new and greatly enlarged plan” for “emergency public works,” the Works Progress Administration (WPA). In the same speech the president revealed his disdain for “relief,” social assistance available to all in need irrespective of their ability to work.
Roosevelt was driven to WPA by two forces, the social upheaval and labor actions of the preceding years culminating in the extraordinary strikes of 1934, and the counsel of his advisors, many of whom were far more radical than he in their understanding of the Depression. Influential underconsumptionists and secular stagnationists pushed for a permanent federal government commitment to providing public employment for workers whose benefits had run out, who were not covered or who could not find private employment. But Roosevelt’s stated purpose “to preserve the system of private enterprise for profit” (3) required that his programs be “not so large as to encourage the rejection of opportunities for private employment or the leaving of private employment to engage in Government work [and that they] compete as little as possible with private enterprises.” (1935 State of the Union Address)
The permanent implication of government in the labor market was in the president’s eyes incompatible with these purposes. Roosevelt would support no abiding government guarantee of employment. “Work should be planned with a view to tapering it off in proportion to the speed with which the emergency workers are offered positions with private employers.” (1935 Address) The president thus disabled WPA from directly addressing the deficiency of consumption demand, consisting largely in wage-driven buying power, that defined the Depression. WPA could have paid wages higher than for example what the steel companies were offering, thereby boosting wages in the private sector where most workers would find employment. But he kept the WPA wage so low as “to compete as little as possible with private enterprises.” In an unwitting tribute to inefficiency and waste, steel workers were put to work cutting grass. (4) Here we have a fine illustration of the way in which reform efforts confined by the parameters of the political economy of capitalism function to provide short-run palliatives even as they reproduce the roots of the problem they are intended to solve.
Aristocrats like Roosevelt disparaged relief as encouraging public expectations of government provision of social benefits, and as an alternative to workers’ dependence on the employer to make a living. Roosevelt displayed unabashedly the disdain for relief characteristic of his class. In the 1935 Address he declared that
“[D]ependence upon relief induces a spiritual disintegration fundamentally destructive of the national fiber. To dole out relief in this way is to administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit. It is inimical to the dictates of a sound policy. It is in violation of the traditions of America. Work must be found for able-bodied but destitute workers. The federal government must and shall quit this business of relief.”
CES’s staff were, like so many New Dealers, more radical than the president. They cleverly appealed to traditional American notions of individual independence to argue for a system of national health insurance, without which no citizen could be truly “self-sufficient.” The American Medical Association so heavily imposed upon the Committee that the idea was dropped.
CES’s proposal for Social Security was no less radical. In order to gain Roosevelt’s support for a proposal well to the Left of the president’s instincts and values, they reaffirmed his unyielding distinction between “social insurance” for the “deserving unemployed” and relief or public assistance for the remaining unemployed. But they insisted that in order for this distinction to mark a fair and genuine difference between these groups, the federal government would have to ensure that the opportunity to work was always available. This could be made possible only by permanently providing guarantees of public employment to workers who had exhausted unemployment benefits, or were not insured, or could not find private employment. (5)
WPA would have to be universalized as enduring policy. This was indistinguishable from Keynes’s position noted above. The provision of social welfare could be maximally just and respectful of a citizen’s right, affirmed by Roosevelt himself, to earn a living only if public policies were in place to ensure full employment. Universal coverage of the elderly, CES proposed, would be effected by pensions paid for at first by both workers’ own contributions and the general revenues of the Treasury. Gradually the Treasury’s contribution would grow to cover most or all pension payments.
Roosevelt was adamantly opposed. The “relief” bugaboo kicked in, and the president dismissed the proposal as “the same old dole under another name.” (6) Roosevelt wanted a plan with no traces of relief, no form of government contribution to Americans’ welfare unrelated to their own work contribution. This was to apply both to unemployment and to retirement. It was essential for the
Roosevelt’s conception of Social Security required, then, an economic counterpart to the private individual insurance premium. This was to be the payroll tax, a deduction from the wage. Roosevelt held to this conceit well before he was elected and he reiterated the same commitment years after the Social Security Act was passed. As early as 1930 he declared that any benefits accorded to workers through legislation should “be a result of their own efforts and foresightedness” so that they would “be receiving not charity, but the natural profits (sic) of their years of labor and insurance.” In 1934 he instructed Congress that the program’s funds “should be raised by contribution rather than by general taxation.” In his first meeting with the drafters of the legislation he reiterated that old age insurance “must be self-supporting, without subsidies from general tax sources.” Shortly thereafter he told an assemblage of experts on social insurance programs that Social Security “must not be allowed to become a dole through the mingling of insurance and relief….[and] must be financed by contributions, not taxes.” In response to strong objections from Rexford Tugwell, one of his most articulate underconsumptionist advisors, the president emphasized that he was “inclined toward a wholly contributory scheme with the government not participating.” Two years after SSA was passed Roosevelt reiterated his basic conception of social insurance, and its grounds: “[A]s regards social insurance of all kinds, if I have anything to say about it, it will always be contributed, both on the part of the employer and the employee, on a sound actuarial basis. It means no money out of the Treasury.” (7)
Not only did the contributory scheme mean no money out of the Treasury, it could become a cash cow for Treasury. Roosevelt and his fiscally conservative Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau were in accord that the contributory system had the double economic advantage of linking social benefits to work and ameliorating some of government’s financial problems. Morgenthau anticipated that Social Security taxes could be lent to the Treasury to finance New Deal deficits (much as Lyndon Johnson in 1967 concealed deficits by creating the “unified budget,” counting Social Security surpluses as part of the government’s general operating budget), reducing government’s borrowing needs. Funding Social Security out of general revenues would not have permitted this gambit.
Commenting on the final legislation, historian William E. Leuchtenburg observes that “[T]he law was an astonishingly inept and conservative piece of legislation. In no other welfare system in the world did the state shirk all responsibility for old-age indigency and insist that funds be taken out of the current earnings of workers.” (8)
Radical New Dealers tended to frame the problem in class terms: the “channels of surplus investment,” the “idle’ and “sterile” savings of the rich were seen as the depleted resources of the working class. (9) The logical recourse was to tax the fallow funds of the rich and transfer that purchasing power to the working majority. It is no surprise that none of the popular financing alternatives for Social Security called for payroll tax contributions. A payroll tax was a wage tax, and who would support reducing wages in depression times? A progressive tax would do double duty: it would fund Social Security equitably while performing what so many of Roosevelt’s advisors took to be the cardinal task of the day, to redistribute income downwards.
The nation’s leading social-insurance authorities were among the redistributionists. Abraham Epstein repudiated Roosevelt’s plan as “a system of compulsory payments by the poor for the impoverished” that relieved “the well-to-do from their share of the social burden.” (10) The extent of genuinely Left sentiment pervading congressional debates was reflected in the fact that a social insurance bill extending unemployment benefits, with no financial burden on workers, to all those who had lost jobs for any reason made it through the House Labor Committee in 1935.
Roosevelt had frequently espoused the underconsumption analysis in his radio chats, but he refused to embrace its policy implications. As radical redistribution gained popularity, the administration became defensive, putting forward unconvincing arguments scoffed by conservatives and liberals alike. Roosevelt contended that the payroll tax would be “fair” to employees by virtue of the requirment that the employer too pay a tax into the same fund, demonstrating that the tax was not regressive.
Another of Roosevelt’s most common responses to critics of the wage tax was that it would accomplish two crucial objectives, to give workers a sense of personal and legal right to benefits since they had paid into the system out of their own pockets, and by the same token to ensure that “no damn politician” could ever attempt to take that right away. But if Roosevelt could claim in effect that the Treasury could not afford to pay Social Security benefits out of general revenues, why could not future politicians claim that government could not afford to pay the promised benefits without major “reforms” including extending the retirement age and reducing benefits?
Had Social Security been designed to be funded through “general taxation” it would have the fiscal status of the Pentagon budget. There is no special “fund” dedicated specifically to military aggression. Elites never claim that the Defense budget is running down, is unaffordable, is going broke or is draining resources from more pressing priorities. In an altogether different kind of society, a government guarantee of a lifelong decent standard of living would have just that kind of permanence.
SSA was not merely the nation’s grandest scheme to date to provide essential material security otherwise unavailable to Americans through the normal workings of the market. It was as importantly an exemplar of the profoundly conservative political-economic values and assumptions which would frame all subsequent political struggles around social policy and provision.
Disdain???
I have it for trillion$+++++++ expenditures for weapons of destruction (mass or otherwise), and ALL of the cocksuckers that play in that end of the pool.
Plenty of resources available for houseless junkies, drunkies, flunkys, kiddos, widows, and heroes.
There’s more of ‘em than’muricans real-eyes. ‘Parently, don’t give a fuk.
Back the Blue, and red and white(s), till it happens to ewe.